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Abstract
Cooperation in medicine, as in all group activity, is a key problem both for the actors involved and for 
sociologists. Classical studies in the sociology of health and medicine are moreover of little help in 
conceptualizing this problem. While arguing against the idea that afﬁliation with an institutional structure
– such as a part of a professional segment or an area of expertise – determines relations between actors,
our analysis seeks to move beyond the description of what is presented as being purely contingent. To 
understand phenomena related to cooperation and conﬂict, it is possible and worthwhile to distinguish 
between professionals according to their position in the therapeutic chain and their form of involvement in 
the strategy of care. Cooperation is based, in particular, on the match between “acquisitive” professionals 
who feel it is their duty to coordinate medical care and follow-up on a patient throughout the healing process, 
and other professionals who see their intervention as being limited to one phase in the therapeutic itinerary. 
Keywords: Cooperation; Organization; Referral; Conﬂict; Network; Cancer; Addiction; Health; Sociology of 
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Medicine is a collective activity.1 With clinical and scientific progress as well as professional
and organizational specialization, we have come a long way since the time when medical care
could be described as the unpredictable encounter between one or several physicians and a person
at home, ignorant and helpless in front of the all-powerful expert (Starr, 1982). Not only is
clinical practice today based on collectively accumulated, shared and validated knowledge and
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know-how2 (Cambrosio et al., 2006; Foucault, 1963; Freidson, 1988 [1970]) but the patient’s
care network consists of countless activities and tasks accomplished by many actors. It is not
infrequent to hear the industry-inspired analogy “therapeutic chain” used to describe a complex
assemblage of interventions and professionals. Therefore, as in all group activity, cooperation
between actors “who each preserve a degree of autonomy and pursue not necessarily convergent
interests” (Friedberg, 1993: 352) represents a central problem for the actors involved as much as
for the sociologist studying them.
The problem is all the more remarkable as taking care of a patient is not supposed to con-
form to a hierarchal type of organization. In the first place, medical care is rarely delivered in
a single healthcare organization with all sorts of professionals functionally interconnected and
cooperating according to a preestablished plan. On the contrary, for one and the same health
problem, patients shuttle between neighborhood doctor and hospital, general practitioner and
specialist, and/or between various hospital services that have managed to preserve a large degree
of autonomy. In France, despite recent attempts at regulation aiming to prestructure the care
trajectory (primary provider, health network, care network, etc.) (Bercot and de Koninck, 2006;
Cresson et al., 2003), the care received and the morphology of itineraries observed are still
largely the product of essentially endogenous negotiations and organization. Finally, and above
all, the project manager masterminding the patient’s support structure – the professional who
designs, decides and orchestrates the full course of events – is not appointed at the outset.3 In
short, it is not easy for individuals entering the health system to imagine the form their itinerary
will take, the institutions, systems, and professionals that will be involved, or the types of care
they will receive, because several treatments are generally available for the same health prob-
lem. It therefore seems essential, when a patient is taken on, to understand how the division of
labor will be determined concretely, how it will be organized, and what the logics underpinning
its functional distribution might be; why certain medical, paramedical and social professionals
will collaborate with certain specialists rather than with others; and how that which is recog-
nized as a care network emerged in the first place. In other words, it is important to grasp
the mechanisms underlying this more or less large and specific self-organization and network
structure.
As we shall see in detail further on, existing research yields no completely satisfactory
answer to these questions: not only have they hardly been explored empirically by the soci-
ology of the health professions, but above all, the few studies dedicated to the dynamics of
cooperation and conflict in the field of health do not allow us to account fully for our own
findings.
Comparison of three very different types of support structure – for cancer, drug addiction
and alcohol dependence – has led us to challenge the notion that the nature of relations between
professionals is directly – and almost exclusively – determined by institutional variables such as
2 Which, as we shall see, does not prevent controversy, disagreements and more generally a difference in approach
concerning the treatment of health problems.
3 The recent reform making a primary provider mandatory sought to give French general practitioners (GPs) first say
in guiding the patient through the healthcare system. However, not only did the unions obtain the right for specialists
acknowledged by the French social security system to also be able to fulfill that role – a first rift in the reform – but, on
top of that, the reform does not stipulate who is responsible for clinical decisions. Similarly, as Magali Robelet, Marina
Serré and Yann Bourgueil point out, general practitioners have barely provided the functions of coordination that they are
supposed to in gerontology and palliative medicine networks. Their hypothesis is that such functions are devalued because
considered as mere auxiliaries to the prestigious role of the clinician. They also have a complementary hypothesis, that
GPs remain dependent on the expertise of their colleagues specialized in the given pathology (Robelet et al., 2005).
the type of healthcare organization they work for, the formally organized cooperation between
healthcare organizations, or being part of a segment, a specialty or more generally a group of
professionals. The analytical framework we are proposing also seeks to go beyond the conclu-
sions of other researches that have concentrated mainly on the phenomena of cooperation claimed
to be strictly contingent, i.e. each time unique, so that no analysis can totally detach them from
their particular historical fabric. Our intention is not to devise a general theory of professional
cooperation between actors in the field of healthcare; much more modestly, we would like to
cast some light on the mechanisms that prevail when cooperation networks between partners
associated in the patient support system are created. Thus, we defend the idea that it is worth
distinguishing between professionals according to the position they occupy in the therapeutic
chain and their type of commitment in the care trajectory; thus, between those professionals
that we have dubbed “acquisitive” (“captants”) – because they aim for a central role in deci-
sions concerning treatment and consider it their responsibility to provide or organize each step
of the cure alone – and those we have dubbed “non-acquisitive” (“non-captants”) – because they
feel, on the contrary, that their participation is limited to one stage of the therapeutic itinerary
only. This is one of the main distinctions that allows us to grasp the dynamics of matching4
and the phenomena of cooperation and conflict between partners throughout the therapeutic
chain.
1. Settings and methods
Cancer and drug and alcohol addiction are all pathologies or disorders that constitute long-term
health problems potentially involving different medical specialties and several professionals.5
But apart from that, the characteristics and etiology of these illnesses, as well as the specialists
intervening and the types of structures potentially involved, present sufficiently different starting
points to hopefully make the comparison heuristic and allow us to draw more general conclusions.
In the case of cancer, there are many types of interventions and structures. Aside from the
medical tests done by clinicians, the main specialists involved in the diagnosis are radiolo-
gists, pathologists or specialists of nuclear medicine. The three main “therapeutic weapons”
4 Though our way of thinking is related to Pierre-Michel Menger’s (Menger, 1994, 1997) when he studies “the match”
between participants in artistic productions, major differences prevent us from extending his analysis to the realm of
healthcare. First of all, links between healthcare professionals in France are neither like a contract nor, as in artistic
production, part of a single project; they are informal and recurrent. Above all, the relation between professionals and a
patient’s care network is not a question of employment. We do, however, maintain the term “match” in the rest of our text,
for it expresses well the bilateral nature of those relations, the idea of choice (even if constrained) among protagonists
who decide to work together, and the idea of associating actors whose work logics are compatible.
5 Some of the conclusions presented here were first developed in a previous research report (Bergeron, 2003) based on
material collected during a large study financed by the French Observatory on drugs and drug addiction (Observatoire
franc¸ais des drogues et toxicomanies, OFDT) and carried out with students of the Sociology of Action Master’s program
at the Institut d’études politiques of Paris (class of 2001). Other publications in the fields of drug and alcohol addiction
have appeared (see esp. Bergeron, 1996, 1999). We wish to thank all our research partners warmly for their contribution
to this article. It should also be noted that results are based on studies done before or at the time that in-depth reforms
aimed in particular at coordinating structures for the treatment of drug addiction and alcohol dependence were being
set up. However, we feel that these transformations do not basically change the grounds and relevance of the generic
analytical framework we propose here (i.e. that extends beyond the case of these two fields). As regards cancer treatment,
its organization and recent trends were studied thanks to the support of the National Federation of Cancer Research
Centers (1999–2002), and of the cancer network ONCORA (2003–2007) (see in particular Castel, 2005, 2007; Castel and
Friedberg, 2010).
against cancer are surgery, radiation therapy and medical treatment (essentially chemotherapy,
immunotherapy and hormone therapy) (Pickstone, 2007). There are many specialties involved
when prescribing and implementing treatments: organ specialties (in particular gastroenterol-
ogy, dermatology, lung specialists), surgical specialties (urology, gynecology, pulmonary surgery,
otolaryngology, etc.) and oncology (medical oncology,6 radiation therapy, cancer surgery).
Depending on their qualifications, certain surgeons and radiation therapists can also be authorized
to prescribe medical treatments. Very often these individuals are not all employed in the same
structure: they may be working in an office, a clinic, a service in a hospital of the public sector
or a cancer research center. Twenty such private organizations, some of them founded as early
as the 1920s, participate in the French public hospital system. Their mission includes teaching,
healing and research.
As the scope of this article does not allow us to present separately the treatments for drug
addiction and alcohol dependence, which differ in many respects, we will stress what they have
in common. Both can lead to two sorts of intervention: those that aim to vanquish the supposed
causes (known as the cure) and those whose main objective is to reduce the health consequences
linked to the addiction. Caring for addiction (whether to alcohol or illicit drugs) supposes combat-
ing physical and psychological dependence. Treating psychological dependence begins once the
patient’s withdrawal has succeeded. Several types of therapeutic techniques are then available:
ambulatory psychological or psychosocial follow-up, therapeutic community, etc. In the case of
addiction to opiates, substitution treatments exist as well. Other more palliative treatments are
also available to reduce the deleterious effects of addictive behavior (deterioration of health con-
ditions, contamination by the HIV virus in the case of injected drugs, septicemia, abscesses, etc.).
These are public healthcare practices known as “risk reduction”. Caring for alcoholics and drug
addicts involves a long line of different specialists who all, theoretically, can claim a central role in
organizing the patient’s treatment: drug rehabilitation centers (psychologists, psychiatrists, doc-
tors, social workers, etc.), hospital withdrawal facilities, psychiatric sectors, post-cure centers,
methadone distribution centers, former addicts’ associations, structures for risk reduction, etc.
Very few organizations can offer all the required therapies at once and meet all the needs of all
the patients. Most often, care is the result of more or less successful coordination and cooperation
by a wide variety of partners whose beliefs and therapeutic techniques differ or even clash.
These two fields of research7 were compared a posteriori by applying a conceptual frame-
work with a common denominator8 and a comparable method, borrowing techniques from the
sociological analysis of organized action (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980; Friedberg, 1993). The
method prioritizes semi-structured interviews in order to comprehend what is mainly at stake in
the actors’ activity, and who the other actors are with whom they communicate in their work, so
as to understand and qualify the nature of their relations. This enables us to determine what brings
them together and what divides them.
6 Medical oncologists are specialized in the medical treatment of cancer.
7 Some of the main conclusions presented here were originally reached in the fields of drug addiction and alcohol
dependency (Bergeron, 2003). The fact that similar conclusions were also drawn in the field of cancerology (Castel, 2005,
2007), without direct reference to previous research, led us to review our data, compare our fields systematically and
undertake the present investigation.
8 Other theoretical perspectives enriched each of these research programs but both were placed in a perspective inspired
by Weber’s comprehensive sociology of action.
2. How can professional cooperation in healthcare delivery be accounted for?
Few of the studies carried out in the sociology of health or the sociology of professions fully
account for processes which, in the cases we examined, presided over the concrete organization
of healthcare delivery and created dynamics of cooperation and conflict between professionals
at the time of the patient’s referral and of the planning, implementation and monitoring of the
treatment.
In the first place, few empirical studies have addressed these questions in any detail. To take
only two symbolic examples, it is noteworthy that (informal) networks of physicians occupy only
five pages in Eliot Freidson’s seminal work on the medical profession (Profession of medicine,
Freidson, 1988 [1970]: 192–7). It is equally significant that, in their analysis of the negotiated
order in hospitals, Anselm Strauss and his colleagues explicitly chose to concentrate not on
relations between medical professions but rather on the capacity of lay people and paramedical
workers to influence that order (Strauss et al., 1963). Secondly, and more fundamentally, those
who did examine these dimensions came to conclusions that remain in part unsatisfactory. Without
claiming to cover the field in full, we can outline three bodies of analysis.
A first series of authors interpreted the collective struggles between relatively homogeneous
sub-groups inside the medical profession as the main explanation for the difficulty to cooper-
ate that professionals experience. Specialties – a specifically medical notion often adopted by
sociologists (Pinell, 2005; Weisz, 2005) – and their basic characteristics, at the root of endoge-
nous differentiation, thus theoretically (for these authors) overdetermine the organization of the
local patient care network and therefore the mechanisms, supposed more than observed, of coop-
eration and conflict between concerned professionals (Faure, 2005; Halpern, 1992; Pickstone,
2007; Pinell, 2005). Yet our research shows many cases of conflict and cooperation perfectly
independently from the collective competition and rivalry between specialties or professional seg-
ments or groups. Symmetrically, having the same specialty and belonging to the same segment or
professional group does not, according to our research results, offer the guarantee of full coopera-
tion either. In the field of cancer, we encountered oncologists, for example, working harmoniously
with organ specialists while considering themselves the rivals of professionals who belong to the
same specialty. The same was observed in the case of patient care networks for drug addiction and
alcohol-dependence: we sometimes noted that in certain towns, former alcoholics organizations,
for example, worked in harmony with “their” out-patient neighborhood center at the hospital,
which was not the case in other towns. In the final analysis, giving priority to the specialty (or to
any other form of professional training) as being the independent variable does not allow one to
account for the diversity of local situations in the division of labor among specialties, institutions
and professionals.
Other authors – sociologists (e.g. Bercot, 2006; Schweyer, 2005) as well as professionals –
consider that the key to good cooperation between health professionals lies in sharing similar
beliefs concerning “good” care. Once again, our fieldwork in very different places shows that
actors with widely diverse convictions concerning therapeutic strategies for a given pathology,
or for a given patient, manage to cooperate, while others with similar perspectives are, on the
contrary, in conflict, in stages of avoidance or more generally non-cooperation. For instance,
psychologists in different healthcare centers, who share similar beliefs about what is done and
not done in matters of therapy, in a field where cognitive and axiological disagreements between
professionals are extremely strong – between psychoanalysts who refuse to prescribe psychotropic
drugs, for example, and doctors who have a more biological explanation for the genesis of drug
addiction – manage to cooperate only with difficulty.
Conversely, professionals who do not necessarily share beliefs about care at any given time in
a patient’s itinerary may agree, sometimes tacitly, on compatible versions of their activity. Such
forms of cooperation have been found9 in the field of drug addiction among “risk reduction” teams
who felt that social and sanitary work – finding a place to live, taking care of infections, etc. –
with drug addicts in very deteriorated medical and social conditions had to be dealt with first;
and, on the other hand, psychotherapists of psychoanalytical leanings who thought that offering
immediate sanitary and social assistance would be reproducing the “logic of emergency” in which
drug addicts were already trapped. The normative and cognitive conflicts that opposed the two
did not prevent them from defining territories where they could see eye to eye and carry out their
different interventions without too much trouble. The same sort of analysis can be applied in
the field of cancer, where schematically two conceptions of care compete: organ vs. pathology
(Castel and Friedberg, 2010; Pinell, 1992). While organ specialists very often collaborate with
cancerologists (whether they are radiation specialists, promoters of medical treatment or surgery),
cases where cancerologists or organ specialists feel they are in competition or in conflict among
themselves are also extremely frequent.
A third and very different theoretical perspective is the interactionist one in research by A.
Strauss and other authors following the same line of thinking (Baszanger, 1986; Ménoret, 1999).
It does not explicitly or directly link the organization of patient care networks and the matching
dynamics between health professionals to the structuring into professional segments, that A.
Strauss himself, with Rue Bucher, had already highlighted (Bucher and Strauss, 1961). Rather,
the conclusions of their research reveal the existence of a local and contingent “negotiated order”,
in which the various actors in medical care interpret and adjust in real-time to suit the expectations
of the others involved, and to adapt to the hazards of the patients’ care and diseases. For many
interactionists, conflicts and cooperation are in fact grounded in the conditions of constantly
renewed professional interaction, to the point that looking for factors that determine or circumvent
the specificity of the immediate local conditions of their implementation is deemed to be, if not
illegitimate, then at the very least misleading. Of course, as we have seen, the specialty of the
professional in charge of the initial therapeutic plan and of referring patients to other professionals
– and therefore the form that the organization of labor among professionals will take – varies in the
case of cancer as well as for drug or alcohol addiction, and these observations seem compatible
at first view with an analysis in terms of negotiated order. Nevertheless, it would be risky to
conclude that organizing the patient care network, and the professional cooperation related to it,
are completely unstable social constructs, constantly renegotiated in the course of an eternally
renewed interaction. Once again, our research results uncover stable forms of relations between
care partners. As Florent Champy puts it: “the order of the interaction is not questioned anew
every time there is a hitch in cooperation” (Champy, 2009: 111).
In fact, whether for cancer, drug addiction or alcohol dependence, relations between profession-
als are most often of long duration. All the persons intervening, when asked, are able to mention
a certain number of privileged partners, often called “correspondents” or “referees”, with whom
they collaborate on a regular basis, reciprocally referring patients or requesting something in the
framework of the organizational routines and protocols repeated for each new case.
9 We use the past tense here as this type of cognitive conflict has tended to quieten down over the last ten years. But the
outdated historical character of the heart of the matter does not do away with the principle underpinning the development
of cooperation, which is what we wish to stress here.
3. Elements of professional differentiation: types of patients, position and commitment
Few studies have concentrated on differentiating between professionals according to their
standpoints and the position they choose to occupy along the therapeutic chain, including the
various professional commitments associated with that position. Yet, casting light on those posi-
tions and commitments has a truly heuristic value in that, by revealing basic and fundamental
mechanisms, it allows us to explain how networks are formed and professionals cooperate.
3.1. Positioning along the therapeutic chain
Whether for cancer, drug addiction or alcohol dependence, different types of interventions may
punctuate a patient’s itinerary in the therapeutic arena:
• interventions for diagnosis and assistance in establishing a diagnosis: physiological tests, bio-
logical examinations, talking with a psychologist, administering questionnaires to establish a
patient’s profile on a psychological scale, etc.;
• therapeutic interventions, of which there may be several for one and the same health problem.
These interventions may be complementary, such as surgery, radiation therapy and chemother-
apy for breast cancer, or psychotherapy and antidepressants for nervous breakdowns; but they
can also alternate, such as surgery and radiation therapy for certain forms of prostate can-
cer or surgery vs. radiation therapy with chemotherapy for certain ENT cancers, or analytical
psychotherapy and antidepressants to reduce neuroses;
• palliative or supportive interventions, i.e. activities aimed at alleviating physical or psycho-
logical pain, life-preserving treatments and, in the case of certain pathologies or disturbances,
treating the psychological or somatic consequences of the pathology;10
• post-cure interventions, i.e. supervision and prevention supposed to diminish the risk of a
relapse or detecting it as early as possible.
Schematically, the therapeutic chain is organized following temporal and sequential logics,
though many exceptions to an exaggeratedly general rule must be acknowledged to account for
the diversity in patient trajectories: not only are all the steps not always observed, but some of
them may take place simultaneously, or treatment may precede an in-depth examination when
establishing a diagnosis.
3.2. Selective systems and professionals
A preference for one or several stages of the cure has serious consequences in terms of recruiting
patients: “cure-oriented” professionals typically tend to seek out and maintain in the clinical arena
populations who present those characteristics that correspond to their own operative norms. To
that end, they attempt to build an environment of providers capable of referring to them a clientele
that best conforms to their expectations.
10 It is a well-known fact that for a considerable number of pathologies or disorders, one cannot speak of being cured
stricto sensu but more surely of palliative treatments, as is typically the case for diabetes. We do not wish to contribute
to this debate but admit, with an eye to convention and simplification, that curative methods are those, which aim to treat
the pathology or disturbance itself and not some of its consequences.
Following A. Strauss and his colleagues, who noted that “each ward tries to minimize the
diversity of its medical product by having patients with similar diseases or conditions” (Strauss
et al., 1997 [1985]: 153), professionals of cancer, drug addiction and alcohol dependence are on
the lookout for “patients” suffering from the pathology in which they have specialized, for which
they consider themselves competent and which is compatible with the therapeutic orientations of
their organization, often specialized in a type of clientele, care, pathology, etc. This observation
may seem trivial but we will see that referring a “non-sick” patient to a professional for whom
cure is paramount causes conflict or at least incomprehension and avoidance.
We found this concern with building networks to provide “appropriate” patients in the three
fields studied. Professionals dealing with drug addiction and alcoholism who are interested in the
treatment of addiction per se seek to establish contact with “providers” likely to refer to them
patients motivated to successfully cure their addiction. They are hardly “interested” in occasional
users or alcoholics who feel their addiction is not a problem and who, though dependent (and
thus “ill”), do not see the usefulness of the treatment. As for cancer specialists, who seek to build
lasting relations with physicians who have done the initial tests, so that the patients referred to
them are indeed suffering from cancer or at least present disorders with a high probability of
becoming cancerous. In this way they avoid “wasting time” with patients whom they will not be
treating in the end.11
The “right” care in the “right” context is thus the circumstantial result of an actor being posi-
tioned at a particular point in the therapeutic chain and a patient having arrived at a specific moment
of his/her itinerary and presenting specific characteristics. Drug addiction professionals who offer,
for example, essentially psychotherapeutic care, mainly cater for a particular clientele: individuals
who are prepared to engage in self-analytical methods. Other structures offer treatments in what
is known as a “therapeutic community”, where the group and normative peer pressure play an
essential role in making the method effective, and which postulates a patient “easy to assimilate”
in the organization. Cancer specialists may specialize in certain forms of cancer (breast, prostate,
etc.) but also in certain phases of the illness (initial phase, relapse, metastasis, etc.). They may
agree to be a last resort in the case of a relapse or, on the contrary, prefer to intervene “in the front
line” of the treatment. In all cases, they must be confronted with the “right” patients.
Some of these observations have already been confirmed by the sociology of healthcare: cure-
oriented systems and/or professionals tend to be selective and recruit a clientele liable to espouse
the therapeutic forms and trajectories that they have worked out (see e.g., Freidson, 1988 [1970];
Herzlich, 1973). Patient selection must however be analyzed systematically and not only from
the practitioner’s point of view or that of the service or organization being studied, as exist-
ing research has tended to do to an excessive degree. As we have shown elsewhere (Bergeron,
1996, 1999, 2003; Castel, 2005), selecting patients is not only indispensable to please the indi-
vidual professional (“I treat the patient for whom I am competent”); it is also fundamental for
preserving stable cooperation networks: patients are said to be “well chosen” when their charac-
teristics – pathological as well as social – have the best chance of circulating harmoniously in the
therapeutic arena conceived for them by the partners of the care network.
3.3. The commitment associated to the professional’s positioning
Within the framework of activities linked to treating a disorder or pathology, our fieldwork
showed that two typical forms of therapeutic commitment exist.
11 The appearance of a tumor is not synonymous with cancer; a large number of tumors are classified as benign.
First, either professionals see their intervention as occasional or limited in time and to a specific
link in the therapeutic chain: reception and referral (entry into the system), initial treatment and
auxiliary care, complementary tests and examinations, therapeutic steps of short duration, etc. In
these conditions, professionals must coordinate their activity with a network capable not only of
providing them with the “right patients” but also – even above all – of taking over once the phase
has been completed. In so doing, these professionals consider themselves as links in a therapeutic
chain they do not control from end to end. As the last sentence in the following excerpt shows,
however, this sort of commitment is not always intentional; some professionals feel constrained
being confined to only part of the care network.
“Q: So, if I understand correctly, in the case of sarcoma, you intervene once and then it’s
taken over. . .
R: . . . by a team of specialists. I don’t handle those patients at all. First of all because I
only do surgery. Afterwards they get chemotherapy and I don’t do chemo. And if there’s a
relapse, it’ll be taken care of by the team at the Center. In case of metastasis, no way, she’ll
get chemotherapy at the Center. That’s the problem we surgeons have: we only control part
of the treatment, the rest of the story happens somewhere else.”12 Interview with a surgeon
in private practice.
Or else, the professionals feel they must as far as possible accompany a patient every step
of the way. In that case they intend to take responsibility for the decisions that determine the
entire therapeutic itinerary alone, assure the patient’s follow-up and care network and control
the information. In short, they feel they must control, exclusively or with the close collaborators
with whom they consult if necessary, what medical experts themselves call “the therapeutic
strategy” or what A. Strauss calls “the trajectory scheme”. Consequently, such professionals need
not cooperate with other professionals or structures, medical or otherwise, except in cases where
the trajectory requires a service or resource that neither they nor the organization in which they
work can provide, or else when administering such a service or resource does not interest them.
As far as possible, these professionals must stay in close touch with the patients and remain their
principal referee during the full course of their healthcare itinerary: they therefore see themselves
at the heart of a star-shaped network and try to create ties with the professionals or structures
liable to refer the patients “back” to them after their intervention.
“What we managed to do is to say «we’re not service providers. You send us the patient and
we’ll decide what to do». We can do that because we’re in a dominant position.” Interview
with a radiation therapist, Cancer Research Center.
We called these professionals “acquisitive”, in the sense that they tend to maintain the patient
within the therapeutic arena.13
12 It must be specified that symmetrical points of view can be found among radiation therapists and medical oncologists
who complain that surgeons, who usually see the patient before they do, “keep the upper hand” with the patient and
confine their role to one of temporary intervention.
13 It is possible to apply our analytical categories to the description that Isabelle Baszanger (1995) made of two typical
ways of functioning by teams working on the treatment of pain, some taking up the position of “assisting” other services
and thus performing momentary interventions, while others sought to acquire the role of “coordinator”.
4. Dynamics of cooperation and conﬂict
Based on the above findings, we contend that:
• the referral of appropriate patients;
• and the combination of acquisitive and non-acquisitive commitments are the ingredients that
create the necessary conditions for lasting cooperation between healthcare providers in the
framework of collective patient support.
Conversely, we contend that conflicts tend to break out when:
• the referral has been faulty, i.e. one of the partners in the chain, whether committed in the short
or the long term, is confronted with a population that does not correspond to its institutional,
organizational and/or therapeutic criteria (the three dimensions being related);
• structures or acquisitive professionals attempt to collaborate with similar structures or profes-
sionals: competition for the follow-up, the (re)definition and control of the therapeutic strategy
generally has deleterious effects on their relationships (when relations exist at all, for some-
times they simply avoid having anything to do with each other), or previously stable cooperation
deteriorates with time if non-acquisitive professionals seek to become acquisitive;
• and partners who all claim to be non-acquisitive are thrown together in a care network: being
referred from one structure to another or from one professional to another is often the fate of
patients whom nobody wants to be responsible for in the long term or whose itinerary nobody
wants to control.
In the final analysis, one can reinterpret the diversity of the local situations we came across as
being just variations on the two interconnected themes: the selection of patients and the cross-
matching (acquisitive/non-acquisitive) of therapeutic commitments.
4.1. Patient referral, appropriate clientele and conﬂict
An illustration of conflict stemming from inappropriate referral of patients is found in rela-
tions between legal organizations and organizations specialized in the treatment of alcohol or
drug addiction. The former frequently refer to the latter patients who are not known addicts but
occasional or excessive consumers who should receive mainly preventive treatment but do not
correspond to the main objective of the activity at hand. Systems specialized in alcohol depen-
dence and drug addiction have long claimed to be principally committed to cure, which hardly
makes them motivated to treat, or even simply to see, persons not considered as needing attention.
“What the law asks us to do is not care but education (an educational relation has effects
on the super-ego whereas the transfer works on the subconscious/the Id). Therapists are not
accustomed to delivering such a service. The law doesn’t realize that education is not care.”
Interview with a psychologist, ambulatory consultation center for alcohol dependency.
“The courts send us people sentenced to receive treatment. Not a very motivated population.
There are many and we’re swamped. The same goes for patients blackmailed by their
company doctor (certain company doctors will sign a certificate of aptitude for an alcoholic
worker only if he promises to get treatment).” Interview with a female facilitator, ambulatory
consultation center for alcohol-dependency.
In cancer care networks, conflicts linked to faulty referral concern, for example, terminal
patients referred by physicians, GPs or specialists, to structures or other professionals who wish
to deal with less advanced stages of cancer. That type of conflict often involves geriatric specialists
who complain that some hospitals or clinics specialized in care tend to send them aged terminal
patients, i.e. often those for whom treatments have failed.
“What we want to do away with is the «I can do nothing more, you can have them» attitude.
That’s not geriatrics! I don’t claim to be Hercules and clean out the Augean Stables! [...] In
a word, the vision of some specialists is that geriatrics means sending us all the patients they
don’t want, that they reject. That’s still sometimes the case and for us and it’s an ongoing
battle.” Interview with a geriatrician, University Hospital center.
We also frequently met medical oncologists who complained that surgeons considered them a
last resort when the illness had metastasized, whereas they would like to be able to intervene at
an earlier stage.
4.2. Matching commitments, cooperation and conﬂicts
The combination of acquisitive and non-acquisitive commitments is another condition for
creating stable networks. This is often the case with relations between hospital centers for alcohol
dependency and self-help organizations for cured alcoholics. The former insist that the latter
– said to be acquisitive – meet on hospital premises, despite sometimes considerable differences
in the conception of what makes for “good therapy”. Since such centers do not have sufficient
follow-up resources to provide post-cure consultations, they generally limit themselves to physical
withdrawal, expecting the organizations for cured alcoholics to capture a clientele tempted to take
root in the reassuring environment of the hospital. To that end, they allow the organizations to do
the rounds of hospitalized patients and even to give talks on their merits and therapeutic successes.
“We have a duty towards alcoholics’ self-help organizations. Every week, they take turns
sending a representative to talk with a nurse. It’s part of our program. And every evening,
somebody from an organization is available for all the hospitalized patients. We don’t
interfere at all, we don’t sit in on these meetings. Everything runs smoothly; once or twice
a year we answer questions.” Interview with a doctor, alcohol-dependency center.
On the other hand, defiance, misunderstandings, competition or even conflicts exist when
acquisitive professionals try to work with other equally acquisitive professionals. There are often
conflicts, for example between the psychiatric services and certain centers for drug addiction or
alcohol-dependence.
“If, in the outpatient consultation center for alcohol dependency, an underlying mental
illness is detected, we send the patient to the medico-psychological center (centre médico-
psychologique, CMP), but the CMP keeps the patient and the follow-up becomes exclusively
CMP, and if the patient has a psychological problem he or she also has an alcohol problem.
[. . .] We don’t see eye to eye with them over that.” Interview with a female community
worker, ambulatory consultation center for alcohol dependency.
“Many structures close the door as soon as you send them a young person. They take over
saying it must be anonymous and confidential. When I phone X (physician in a specialized
center attached to a hospital service of the psychiatric sector), they won’t even tell me if the
young person has been hospitalized there or not. So I go through my own network. That
way at least I don’t lose touch.” Interview with a psychologist, center specialized in drug
addiction.
Generally speaking, conflicts in the field of drug addiction and alcohol dependence typically
oppose two structures or, more precisely, two professionals belonging to two organizations, that
focus on the therapeutic aspect of the care trajectory, whatever their therapeutic orientation might
be (psychoanalysis, substitution treatment, sociopedagogical follow-up, etc.). Each of them claim
exclusive control of the therapeutic strategy, the medical follow-up14 and decisions concerning
patients’ therapeutic destiny.15
“One has to be able to compromise and adapt. Theoretically, one should consider that a
person is leaving one institution for another. But it’s not true that everybody makes that
sort of connection. It’s important for a person to be able to settle down somewhere. [. . .]
But it’s not easy to set up. Everyone is probably afraid of losing something. The medical is
all-powerful and rules over everything.” Interview with manager of a home.
“The question for tomorrow is: «will alcohol dependency become part of general medical
practice?» The reality of the patient goes unnoticed in other care circuits, the physician
who invested and built up a relationship with the patient feels a little bitter if he or she
is sent elsewhere, to a service of general medicine.” Interview with head of ambulatory
consultation center for alcohol dependency.
In a very similar way, conflicts in the field of cancer also concern the control of the patients’
trajectories and frequently oppose professionals liable to perform at least one of the three main
cancer treatments: surgery, radiation therapy and chemotherapy. As classical sociological texts
have already shown (Freidson, 1988 [1970]; Hall, 1946), surgeons tend to compete with other
surgeons. But cooperation and conflict are more visible in the analytical framework developed
here: conflicts exist because some professionals refuse to be at others’ “service”, i.e. refuse to be
confined to the role of administrator of a treatment which is part of a therapeutic scheme for which
the general course of events was defined by other professionals. Conversely, cooperation can bloom
when the professionals of one organization agree to intervene at one point at the service of a project
manager. The following two cases observed in two different regions are particularly significant
in this respect: in two different types of organization, two professionals were similarly criticized
by their peers who reproached them for agreeing to implement a treatment decided by colleagues
in other organizations, while they themselves aimed for a clearly more acquisitive position.
“I am referee16 for hematology at the University Hospital, for gastric problems and as
oncopediatrician. [. . .] Providing services [in the cancer research center] is still considered
prostitution [. . .] For people [of the cancer research center], providing a service means
14 We specify “curative follow-up” in the sense that what interests the therapist and doctors is the follow-up during the
phases punctuating the entire curative process. Professionals do not consider post-cure check-ups for possible relapses to
be particularly valuable or to justify investing resources and energy to stay in control. Thus, for example, the post-treatment
follow-up of a cancerous tumor, considered routine, will not be fought over and will willingly be left to other professionals,
it being expressly understood that those professionals will address the patients to them again in case a relapse is suspected.
15 Such conflicts around the possible capture of clientele were revealed at the very core of the care structure for drug
addiction, where the first encounter with the patient – decisive to set oneself up as permanent referee – can become a stake
in the competition between psychologists and/or educators (see Bergeron, 1996; Blangy, 1993).
16 The term “referee” has a different meaning here from the use we have made of it up to now. In the present case, it
means “correspondent” or “appointed interlocutor”.
you’re being submissive because you’re accepting someone else’s prescription. I’m not
being submissive: University Hospital doctors are just as competent as we are!” Interview
with a radiation therapist, cancer research center.
“I had to fight at least fifteen times with [Dr X, medical oncologist in the same hospital]
who continues doing chemo for the ENT specialists in town who don’t want to go through
the consultation [that I’m responsible for]. In my opinion, it reduces patients’ chances. I
yelled at him. [. . .] He answered: «I don’t have the right to judge. . .» I said to him: “But
you’re not a service provider!” Surgeon, Hospital center.
It becomes easier to understand that cooperation networks of acquisitive professionals are
made in such a way that the structure or specialist to whom patients are addressed for a specific
therapeutic act will not keep them but will send them back to the same professional referee once
the one-off intervention is over. The general tendency is for a cooperation network to stabilize
thanks to those who guarantee what we might familiarly term a “return to sender” system. The
wish to constitute a professional network preferentially made up of those who agree to perform
limited interventions may even lead some actors to build lasting relationships with professionals or
structures that provide complementary and sought-after services but that are not in their immediate
geographic perimeter and thus force the patient to make long trips (Bergeron, 1996). On the scale of
a territory, such a mechanism offers an explanation for the often compartmentalized and relatively
impervious way these connections are built – a result of the fact that the professionals who compose
them do not communicate and hardly work together, even though that might conceivably be
convenient in the case of some patients, from a medical point of view. The organizations within
which these particular forms of network are formed have only a vague idea about what their
rationale might be. They must therefore be analyzed as the outcome of professional efforts at
creating acquisitive-non acquisitive partnerships.
4.3. Strategies of matching and stabilizing networks
The cooperation networks observed show a form of stability but they are not eternal and
continuously need to be maintained, in particular to ensure that certain partners are not tempted to
renegotiate their commitment in the network when they are no longer satisfied with the existing
forms of cooperation. Without claiming to be exhaustive, we have identified several strategies for
constituting and maintaining a network.
To begin with, we identified a strategy of self-interested sharing of information: an acquisitive
professional decided to communicate to certain partners some of the information concerning
the evolution of the pathology of a patient who was at the end of a phase of treatment. Some
acquisitive healthcare people dealing with addictions go to great lengths to share information
about their patients’ future with their transitory partners, which is a great source of professional
satisfaction to the latter, since it allows them to clarify the meaning of the service they render and
to set it within the trajectory over which they have only partial control. That information is all the
more meaningful in the eyes of the non-acquisitive personnel since, in the case of drug addiction
and alcohol dependency, where relapses are frequent, the rate of failure is high and the number
of “missing persons” is considerable. It is a way of limiting the feeling of professional burnout
so often expressed (Bergeron, 1999) and, by so doing, of minimizing some of the reasons for
dissatisfaction linked to the structure of existing networks.
“Alternating follow-up” in the field of cancer is a second strategy by which cooperation
networks between acquisitive and non-acquisitive professionals are stabilized. An acquisitive
physician agrees with one of his/her partners to share supervision of the patients. Though the
logics are similar to the previous case, sharing here is more significant since the non-acquisitive
doctors also get to see the patient. Not only are they able to ask for the examinations they need
to evaluate the patient’s condition – and the effects of the other partners’ action – they also find
satisfaction in the direct contact with the patient, which as we know is highly valued in a clinical
ethos (cf. e.g., Freidson, 1988 [1970]; Starr, 1982). Similar situations also occur in the field of
drug addiction, when two structures jointly follow up a patient. Typically, one takes charge of
the social follow-up and the other the somatic and/or psychological treatment. However, in many
cases one of the two – often the social follow-up – is subordinated to the more psychological
or somatic one, in the sense that decisions structuring the patient’s trajectory obviously depend
more on the medical or psychotherapeutic team than on the social workers. In our surveys, cases
of double follow-up were equitably double only from a formal point of view: it is mainly the
teams of psychotherapists and/or doctors who shape the care trajectory of the drug addict under
treatment, and the social-pedagogical team can only adapt. One might interpret all these cases
as attempts at symbolically staging well-balanced cooperation that maintains the impression of
the two teams contributing equally to the cure – and consequently limits the suspicion of simply
being used within a therapeutic process whose meaning and direction escape one of the two.
Setting up meetings for “multidisciplinary exchange” in the field of cancer – meaning that
the patient’s medical file will periodically be examined by a college of doctors in which at least
one surgeon, one radiation therapist and one chemotherapist must participate – is another way
of building and maintaining a network. Of course, the decision concerning the care trajectory is
no longer the responsibility of a single doctor, since the meetings allow other professionals to
enter the discussion. Nevertheless, there again, that development has not given rise to absolute
symmetry in decision-making or to a control of the trajectory shared equally by all those taking
part in the treatment. On the one hand, certain physicians who used to be non-acquisitive may use
these opportunities to enhance their local authority and renegotiate an acquisitive commitment –
which some colleagues may accept and others only put up with (Castel, 2007). In other words,
in such cases the actual organization of the local network may find itself changed even though
the underlying logics of acquisitive and non-acquisitive matching persist. On the other hand,
acquisitive doctors who so wish, have the resources to maintain their form of commitment. In the
first place, not all of them agree to participate in these meetings. Secondly, acquisitive doctors
often choose their moment for presenting a case at the meeting. Thus, they may first start the
treatment and set it on a course that necessarily limits the range of possibilities. Finally, they
have the last word concerning the decision, even though in theory it is necessary for the medical
record to justify why they did not accept the solution recommended by the group. They also
choose the other partners they will be calling upon as the treatment proceeds. In short, still today,
what prevails is a “collegiality of opinion” rather than a “collegiality of direction” (Weber, 1971
[1922]).
Finally, in the various fields that we studied, the more or less generous information-sharing and
decision-making, and the concessions concerning the possibility of ensuring a more or less joint
follow up, are variations of the matching model that we described here, rather than contradictions
that question its relevance. They correspond to attempts to limit the feeling of being used, that cer-
tain non-acquisitive professionals experience17, and aim to stabilize cooperation networks, which
17 We write “certain non-acquisitive professionals” because, as we have pointed out, certain professionals performing
“momentary” interventions are perfectly satisfied with that sort of commitment: such is the case of some generalists,
 have remained structurally unbalanced. The elementary logics of the 
organization of medical work among professionals are and remain on the whole unchanged.
5. Conclusion
The approach presented here, consisting in distinguishing between professionals according to
their positioning and commitment in the therapeutic chain, can be seen as an intermediate analyt-
ical framework. It lies between approaches that see relations between professionals as emanating
directly (i.e. without precisely saying why, or in other words, without revealing their precise
mechanisms) from the macrological characteristics of institutional ensembles, and microsocio-
logical approaches which content that those relations are essentially the precarious and contingent
products of a unique type of interaction (without any underlying principle of (pre)structuring).
Maximizing the number of clients and acts per client has often been presented as one possible
reason for the particular structure professional networks have. We have shown that it is only
one of the factors in the cooperative or conflictive relations between partners in a patient’s care
network, which cannot be reduced to simply numerical or financial logics. Although scrutinizing
the organization of care to see how it is structured casts some light on situations where certain
professionals are dissatisfied with their commitment, the logics of the division of labor among
professionals cannot be reduced to contracting out the “dirty work” so often observed following
the seminal conclusions of Everett C. Hughes (1996) on these aspects. Performing a surgical
act or a diagnosis, even if one is non-acquisitive, remains an activity that many professionals
consider noble. The logics of the division of labor and competition that we observed refer more
fundamentally, or equally, to the type of positioning and commitment that the professionals
concerned have chosen.
Our survey also allows us to understand more precisely why the formal healthcare networks
– an institutional innovation in which the French Ministry of Health has placed much hope – tend to
endorse and institutionalize existing forms of collective cooperation rather than creating new ones
(Schweyer, 2005). The match between professionals is based on network logics that make sudden
changes decreed from above on longstanding, stable relationships rather improbable. We must
therefore temper the hopes that have been placed in them – including by sociologists – as to the
amplitude of changes they would be capable of generating in the actual organization of healthcare.
Admittedly, learning to know about their partners’ specific characteristics and operative logics
(shared knowledge on the roles and expectations concerning the different parties involved in
the network) through repeated meetings within a network formally constituted in response to
injunctions from above, constitutes favorable conditions for cooperation. It is however doubtful
that networks can function based on a “certain conception of care that gives precedence to a
shared, i.e. more egalitarian, approach among health professionals” (Schweyer, 2005: 91). On the
contrary, networks of professionals associated in patients’ care put together partners who are not
positioned and committed in the same way. Above all, they do not all take part in what Michel
Castra (2003) has called “care politics” and what we have called “therapeutic strategy”.18 Either
alcohol-dependency units or hospital services carrying out physical withdrawal in the case of drug or alcohol addiction, or
in the case of cancer of certain radiation therapists, anatomy-pathologists, general practitioners, etc. Capture is a resource
for some, a constraint for others.
18 The study of the networks dealing with AIDS in the Bordeaux region (Langlois, 2007) confirms this sort of study:
after a first phase during which, while the battle against AIDS was being organized, certain general practitioners made
that pathology their specialization in the hope of establishing more balanced relations with their counterparts in hospitals
the formal networks imposed “from the outside” function because they actualize longstanding
acquisitive/non-acquisitive matches, or they remain “empty shells” or an arena for competition
between actors either trying to monopolize the definition of the therapeutic strategy or refusing
to take responsibility for it.
Even if the “detour” by specialties does not suffice to account for phenomena of coopera-
tion and conflict among professionals operating in local care networks, the analytical framework
proposed here does – in a sense conversely – allow us to reinterpret advantageously some of the
dynamics of competition that exist between medical specialties.19 We can thus venture a first
hypothesis that, in some cases, the attempt to establish a specialty or sub-specialty is one of
the ways members of a segment or group of professionals – who tend to be confined against
their will in other specialties – respond to a major commitment of non-acquisitive professionals.
The existence of a (sub-)specialty, when efforts to institutionalize it have been successful, repre-
sents an official resource permitting non-acquisitive actors to negotiate more efficiently (though
without any local guarantee) an acquisitive commitment with respect to the other professionals
involved.20
We might try a second hypothesis, inspired by the research carried out by Sydney A. Halpern
(1992),21 i.e. that phenomena of competition among specialties are not all due to a “jurisdictional
battle” aimed mainly at confiscating the responsibility for a disease or a pathology from one
specialty at the expense of the other(s) which until then had monopolized it. Some jurisdictional
than was the case with other pathologies. Emmanuel Langlois underscores the frustration they express today with regard
to a situation whereby the hospital has recovered its centrality in “pyramidal” networks.
19 It is however plausible that a connection does exist – although a weak one as we said in our introduction – between
specialization and type of positioning and commitment. One may therefore venture that e.g. psychiatrists tend rather to
adopt a curative position and an acquisitive commitment. Within the limits of this paper, we cannot list all the specialties
or activities whose characteristics are liable to increase the probability that professionals in those fields are acquisitive
or non-acquisitive. We might however formulate a few hypotheses – which would deserve to be checked, elaborated
more systematically and above all completed and developed – on the differential ability of actors to accept or reject a
non-acquisitive status. We might posit that actors belonging to specialties or intervening momentarily at a relatively low
technical level, therefore not a very lucrative activity from a symbolic and (often) consequently also financial point of
view, tend to make attempts at being associated more manifestly in the follow-up and the definition of the therapeutic
strategy. Conversely, a high technical level and consequently high symbolic and financial rewards seem to favor acceptance
of the fact that one’s intervention is momentary, as is the case with radiation therapists and anesthetists. In a similar and
comparable way, hardship at work supposedly increases the temptation to “rise” from performing an isolated act to
controlling the therapeutic strategy. One might also suggest hypotheses on the greater or lesser degree of the conflictive
nature of medical fields: e.g. it is likely that the longer the expected treatment of a pathology or disturbance, the more
the follow-up will be considered noble, gratifying and interesting for the professionals involved. This will most certainly
also stir up more intense struggles for controlling the therapeutic strategy. Lastly, one could also point out that the greater
the degree of substitutability of the therapeutic techniques involved in solving a health problem (i.e. when several types
of activity can produce relatively comparable therapeutic results), the more the temptation to become acquisitive will be
structurally divided among healthcare actors. In contrast, when one technique clearly dominates (in terms of the therapeutic
results obtained), the other activities tend to be kept within the bounds of isolated interventions. Many other hypotheses
might be suggested but that would be the subject of (at least) one other article.
20 That is for example the case of oncologists and gerontologists who intervene specifically in the field of geriatric
oncology and seek to organize as a sub-specialty (oncogeriatrics), to avoid having to play the role of “providers” for
medical, “generalist” surgeons and oncologists (Buthion and Castel, 2006).
21 This author is the first to have shown that analysis in terms of “jurisdiction”, as proposed by Andrew Abbott (1988)
– and for whom it concerned relations between professions or between professional groups – could be used profitably in
the study of relations between medical specialties. For the author, there even exists an interdependence between those two
levels of jurisdiction: the legal battle between specialties (in the sense of monopolizing the treatment of a health problem)
would in certain cases explain the erosion of the jurisdiction of the profession as a whole.
competitions aim rather to capture, i.e. to institutionally assert a more obviously acquisitive
commitment, without that capture necessarily meaning that other specialties are excluded from
the treatment. This approach facilitates a more effective dialogue between institutional levels
(specialties, segments, etc.), from the point of view both of the organization and of the local
division of labor.
To conclude, it is worth considering the application of our analytical framework not only to
healthcare but also to other fields. Here again, the aim would be a better grasp of the mechanisms
underpinning the division of labor between different professionals who, free from any outside
(pre)determined hierarchy, participate in a common project – for instance a scientific or industrial
project or several lawyers collaborating on a case. It would then be possible to test the eventuality
that crossed matches between an actor who controls what interactionists call “the arc of work”
(Strauss et al., 1997) and other actors who agree to intervene more occasionally, are also conducive
to the stabilization of professional cooperation.
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